Gwen Bradford presents the first systematic account of what achievements are, and why they are worth the effort. She argues that more things count as achievements than we might have thought, and offers a new perfectionist theory of value in which difficulty, perhaps surprisingly, plays a central part in characterizing achievements.

The current study assessed potential relationships among childhood wayfinding experience, navigational style, and adult wayfinding anxiety in the Faroe Islands. The Faroe Islands are of interest because they have an unusual geography that may promote the use of an orientational style of navigation (e.g., use of cardinal directions). Faroese adults completed questionnaires assessing (1) their permitted childhood range sizes, (2) the types of navigational strategies they use, and (3) the amount of anxiety they experience when navigating in adulthood. Males had (...) more childhood wayfinding experience, used the orientation strategy at a higher rate, and showed lower levels of wayfinding anxiety. When compared with other cultures, both Faroese women and men appear to embrace orientation strategies at an unusually high rate. Childhood experience was not conclusively linked to later wayfinding anxiety. However, the current findings raise the possibility that children who have particularly small ranges in childhood may be especially anxious when navigating in adulthood. (shrink)

Using a 2×2×2 experimental design, the effects of situational and individual variables on individuals' intentions to act unethically were investigated. Specifically examined were three situational variables: (1) quality of the work experience (good versus poor), (2) peer influences (unethical versus ethical), and (3) managerial influences (unethical versus ethical), and three individual variables: (4) locus of control, (5) Machiavellianism, and (6) gender, on individuals' behavioral intentions in an ethically ambiguous dilemma in an work setting. Experiment 1 revealed main effects for quality (...) of work experience, Machiavellianism, locus of control, and an interaction effect for peer influences and managerial influences. Experiment 2 showed main effects for all three situational variables and Machiavellianism. Neither experiment supported gender differences. Limitations, future research, and implications for management are discussed. (shrink)

With Artificial Intelligence entering our lives in novel ways—both known and unknown to us—there is both the enhancement of existing ethical issues associated with AI as well as the rise of new ethical issues. There is much focus on opening up the ‘black box’ of modern machine-learning algorithms to understand the reasoning behind their decisions—especially morally salient decisions. However, some applications of AI which are no doubt beneficial to society rely upon these black boxes. Rather than requiring algorithms to be (...) transparent we should focus on constraining AI and those machines powered by AI within microenvironments—both physical and virtual—which allow these machines to realize their function whilst preventing harm to humans. In the field of robotics this is called ‘envelopment’. However, to put an ‘envelope’ around AI-powered machines we need to know some basic things about them which we are often in the dark about. The properties we need to know are the: training data, inputs, functions, outputs, and boundaries. This knowledge is a necessary first step towards the envelopment of AI-powered machines. It is only with this knowledge that we can responsibly regulate, use, and live in a world populated by these machines. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement that there should be a principle requiring that artificial intelligence be ‘explicable’. Microsoft, Google, the World Economic Forum, the draft AI ethics guidelines for the EU commission, etc. all include a principle for AI that falls under the umbrella of ‘explicability’. Roughly, the principle states that “for AI to promote and not constrain human autonomy, our ‘decision about who should decide’ must be informed by knowledge of how AI would act instead of us” :689–707, 2018). There (...) is a strong intuition that if an algorithm decides, for example, whether to give someone a loan, then that algorithm should be explicable. I argue here, however, that such a principle is misdirected. The property of requiring explicability should attach to a particular action or decision rather than the entity making that decision. It is the context and the potential harm resulting from decisions that drive the moral need for explicability—not the process by which decisions are reached. Related to this is the fact that AI is used for many low-risk purposes for which it would be unnecessary to require that it be explicable. A principle requiring explicability would prevent us from reaping the benefits of AI used in these situations. Finally, the explanations given by explicable AI are only fruitful if we already know which considerations are acceptable for the decision at hand. If we already have these considerations, then there is no need to use contemporary AI algorithms because standard automation would be available. In other words, a principle of explicability for AI makes the use of AI redundant. (shrink)

Achievement is among the central goods in life, but just what is achievement, and how is it valuable? There is reason to think that it is a constitutive part of wellbeing; yet, it is possible to sacrifice wellbeing for the sake of achievement. How might it have been worthwhile, if not in terms of wellbeing? Perhaps, achievement is an intrinsic good, or perhaps it is valuable in terms of meaning in life. This article considers various ways in which we can (...) understand the nature and value of achievement, as well as the significance of achievement for other areas of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

In light of arguments that citizen science has the potential to make environmental knowledge and policy more robust and democratic, this article inquires into the factors that shape the ability of citizen science to actually influence scientists and decision makers. Using the case of community-based air toxics monitoring with ‘‘buckets,’’ it argues that citizen science’s effectiveness is significantly influenced by standards and standardized practices. It demonstrates that, on one hand, standards serve a boundary-bridging function that affords bucket monitoring data a (...) crucial measure of legitimacy among experts. On the other hand, standards simultaneously serve a boundary-policing function, allowing experts to dismiss bucket data as irrelevant to the central project of air quality assessment. The article thus calls attention to standard setting as an important site of intervention for citizen science-based efforts to democratize science and policy. (shrink)

Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely held thesis, namely the thesis that there is a pro (...) tanto reason to promote the good. It is argued that there is a second, distinct type of uniqueness that plays a more interesting and important axiological role: uniqueness imparts irreplaceable value. This gives occasion to develop the surprisingly undertheorized notion of irreplaceable value. (shrink)

We examine the impact of recent policy on the nature of competition within English higher education (HE) for students. Revisions made to the method of allocating Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) teaching funds and the introduction of performance monitoring and targeted recruitment premiums have changed the incentives facing higher education institutions (HEI)s when designing recruitment strategies. We consider the extent to which the experience of similar market-based reforms on the English secondary schooling system is being replicated in HE. (...) Promoting increased competition by comparison was advocated as a means of stimulating greater allocative, technical and dynamic efficiency in both schools and universities. Similarly, relaxing institutions' capacity constraints and introducing targeted financial incentives have been touted as effective mechanisms to assist the attainment of policy objectives. However, the experience of market-based reforms of state secondary schooling indicates that dysfunctional responses occur and that the overall impact on market behaviour is more complex than anticipated. We consider whether similar processes are evolving in HE. (shrink)

Freely given informed consent to participation is the ethical cornerstone of research in health care. However, in mental health settings, there are many patients who lack the capacity to give such consent to participate in research. There is an abundance of guidance now available on how researchers might think about this issue and the Royal College of Psychiatrists has also recently reviewed its guidance to members about the ethics of research. In this piece, I will discuss some of the issues (...) that were raised during the revision process, and add some reflections of my own. (shrink)

In Achievement, I suggest that failures can be just as good as achievements. Achievements are valuable because of their effort and competence, and some failures have these features too, and are therefore valuable for the same reasons. While that may be true, surely it’s also true that failures are, or can be, genuinely bad – not merely a privation of the good of achievement, but themselves intrinsically bad. As is the case for many bads, it is surprisingly difficult to give (...) an account that is not merely privative: viewed one way, a failure is simply a privation of attaining an end. This challenge is compounded by perfectionist theory of value, which may yield the most plausible account of achievement, but traditionally only offers an account of bads as privative. In this paper, I develop an account of failure as a robust bad by appealing to contrastive ends and the framework of tripartite perfectionism. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss challenges associated with implementing a policy for Ancillary Care (AC) for related and unrelated (serious) adverse events during an Ebola vaccine trial conducted in a remote area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Conducting clinical trials in resourceconstrained settings can raise context-related challenges that have implications for study participants’ health and wellbeing. During the Ebola vaccine study, three participants were injured in road traffic accidents, but there were unexpected difficulties when trying to apply the (...) AC policy. First, because of the nature of the adverse events, the insurer refused to cover the costs. Second, the AC policy did not address treatments by traditional medicine, even though traditional medicines are frequently used and highly trusted in the study community. This highlighted a contrast between the researchers’ well-intentioned AC approach and the participants’ legitimate preferences. The way in which researchers should address their responsibility to provide AC is not straightforward; it requires contextualization. Our experience highlights the importance of involving community representatives and the local ethics committee to ensure development of an AC policy that is culturally and ethically appropriate. Additionally, the insurance contract should clearly stipulate which adverse events are linked to the trial participation, and thus eligible for coverage, to avoid controversies when claims are made. (shrink)

In this introduction to the philosophical study of religion Gwen Griffith-Dickson attempts to fill an important gap by considering these questions squarely in the context of the world's many religions and philosophical traditions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 185-187 [Access article in PDF] Measuring Moral Identities:Psychopaths and Responsibility Gwen Adshead Doctor Ciocchetti examines the responsibility of psychopaths as a function of psychological capacities operating within relationships. He then argues against the punishment of psychopaths. I have some sympathy with both views, but perhaps argued in different ways, and from different standpoints, based on my clinical experience.Doctor Ciocchetti's offers an unusual (...) account of responsibility as a concept that involves at least two people, and perhaps many more than two; and this I would entirely support. In this sense, responsibility is a transitive and dynamic process that involves not only the personal sense of ownership of an action or thought, but also the attribution of responsibility by others. Moral, when applied to intentions, seems to me to suggest that they are intentions that involve another person and that they are held by an active agent who can make choices about those intentions. Responsibility implies not only causal responsibility, but also that the actor owns his own intentions about his behaviors toward others.Responsibility, either as experienced by the actor or attributed by others, is a type of moral judgment; an exercise in moral reasoning. Following Gilligan (1987), I am persuaded that moral reasoning, or the discourse of ought-and-should is relational in nature and must be seen in the context of relationships. I think much of the early work on moral reasoning in offenders is flawed because it assumes that moral reasoning was a capacity like serum bilirubin: normally distributed out there in the population, and able to be measured by an objective observer, in a process independent of the findings. Unsurprisingly, these studies found either that offenders had immature moral reasoning capacities (which we might have guessed already), or they had normal moral reasoning capacity, which was disturbing and puzzling.What we want to understand is how people come to let themselves do horrible things to others. Cioccchetti argues that psychopaths can do these things because they lack the affective capacities needed to respond to others' distress. Ordinary people care about harm to others (including the physical self/body and sentient animals) and demand explanations for the deliberate infliction of suffering on others. It is not only the lack of participant attitudes in the psychopath that bother us; it is our own responses, expressive of our participant attitudes, that tell us something about what this person is, and what is wrong. In my view, this is what punishment is all about for us, the larger social group [End Page 185] forced to respond to the distressing and disturbing actions of others.As Ciocchetti suggests, it is the perceived guilt of the offender that justifies the punishment; it is also the experienced distress of those affected that drives the need for punishment. The distress is part of the relationship between the victim and the offender; the victim is often just as active as the offender.The issue becomes most clear in relation to capital punishment and its supporters, especially those who wish not only to view executions, but also to broadcast them. In considering this, there are two useful sources of information: first, studies of the reactions of those who witness executions, and second, studies of the impact of murder on those related to the murder victim, so-called secondary victims. In those states that have capital punishment in the United States, it is often the secondary victims who witness the execution. They often have testified to the appalling impact of the offender's crime on them; most states give them a right to be present at the execution, even if they do not exercise it. It is hard not to think that it is the enormity of the feelings caused by the offender's wrongdoing that the death sentence is designed to address; the death of the offender changes the relationship between victim and offender, as much as the death of the original victim changes the relationship with their relatives. One might then wonder about the impact of his or her execution on the relatives... (shrink)

Many philosophers tacitly accept the View: consciousness is necessary for being a welfare subject. That is, in order to be an eligible bearer of welfare goods and bads, an entity must be capable of phenomenal consciousness. However, this paper argues that, in the absence of a compelling rationale, we are not licensed to accept the View, because doing so amounts to fallacious reasoning in theorizing about welfare: insisting on the View when consciousness is not in fact important for welfare value (...) in a systematic and significant way is objectionably “consciousist.” As a result, the View does not advance our understanding of the value of consciousness. The paper further diagnoses why we may be attracted to the View, and what we should accept instead. (shrink)

Current research in moral development suggests that there are two distinct modes of moral reasoning, one based on a morality of justice, the other based on a morality of care. The research presented here examines the kinds of moral reasoning used by managers in work-related conflicts. Twenty men and twenty women were randomly selected from the population of first level managers in a Fortune 100 industrial corporation. In open-ended interviews each participant was asked to describe a situation of moral conflict (...) in her or his work life. The results indicated a clearly preferred mode of moral reasoning among the participants who described moral conflicts. Nearly all of these predominated with a justice orientation. These findings suggest that a correlation between gender and preferred mode may be context specific. (shrink)

Pain, failure and false beliefs all make a life worse, or so it is plausible to think. These things and possibly others seem to be intrinsically bad—no matter what further good comes of them they make a life worse pro tanto. In spite of the obvious badness, this is difficult to explain. While there are many accounts of well-being, few are up to the challenge of a univocal explanation of ill-being. Perfectionism has particular difficulty. Otherwise, it is a theory that (...) has quite a lot in its favour. This paper proposes a new valuation scheme for perfectionism, the tripartite scheme, which affords perfectionism the resources to give a comprehensive account of robust bads and has further additional advantages for the view. (shrink)

In this essay, I analyze the pedagogical system contained within Jacques Rancière’s, paying special attention to the conceptions of knowledge and learning that follow from the presupposition of the equality of intelligence between teachers and students. From this, I show how the Rancièrian pedagogical system introduces the problem of distraction and suggest that the phenomenon of distraction in learning presents a problem for emancipatory teachers. I conclude by considering the role that pleasure plays in learning and suggest that cultivating pleasure (...) minimizes the problem of distraction. (shrink)

In this essay, I analyze the pedagogical system contained within Jacques Rancière’s "The Ignorant Schoolmaster," paying special attention to the conceptions of knowledge and learning that follow from the presupposition of the equality of intelligence between teachers and students. From this, I show how the Rancièrian pedagogical system introduces the problem of distraction and suggest that the phenomenon of distraction in learning presents a problem for emancipatory teachers. I conclude by considering the role that pleasure plays in learning and suggest (...) that cultivating pleasure minimizes the problem of distraction. (shrink)

Spatial experience in childhood is a factor in the development of spatial abilities. In this study, we assessed whether American and Faroese participants’ (N = 246, Mage = 19.31 years, 151 females) early spatial experience and adult spatial outcomes differed by gender and culture, and if early experience was related to adult performance and behavior. Participants completed retrospective reports on their childhood spatial experience, both large-scale (permitted childhood range size) and small-scale (Lego play). They also completed assessments of their current (...) large-scale spatial behavior (navigational strategy) and small-scale ability (mental rotation task, MRT). We replicated earlier results showing better MRT performance among males and more reliance by males on orientation navigational strategies, although males and females reported similar ranges as children. However, there were cross-cultural differences, with Faroese having larger childhood ranges, less reliance on route strategies, better MRT scores, and a smaller gender difference in MRT. Larger permitted childhood ranges were associated with reduced use of route strategies for navigation in adulthood, and greater Lego play in childhood predicted better MRT performance as adults. There was also some evidence supporting relationships across spatial scales, with more Lego play predicting an orientation style of navigation and larger childhood ranges predicting better performance on the MRT, although the latter was not independent of country. In sum, we observed an association in both cultures between large-scale childhood experience and large-scale behavior in adulthood, small-scale experience in childhood and adult small-scale performance, and some associations between experience and behavior across spatial scales. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

Mobilizing Hope asks that we take the eradication of poverty as morally mandatory, that we pursue technological development, and that we act on the belief that it is possible to do both of those things at once. It resolutely does not ask that we redefine prosperity in other-than-economic terms, reconsider the binary between “human” and “nature,” question financialization, colonialism, or other root causes of global poverty, accept qualitatively different lifestyles, or endure painful transitions. While this may seem strategic, I argue (...) that bigger asks could be effective in inspiring action. (shrink)

Government officials claim open data can improve internal and external communication and collaboration. These promises hinge on “data intermediaries”: extra-institutional actors that obtain, use, and translate data for the public. However, we know little about why these individuals might regard open data as a site of civic participation. In response, we draw on Ilana Gershon to conceptualize culturally situated and socially constructed perspectives on data, or “data ideologies.” This study employs mixed methodologies to examine why members of the public hold (...) particular data ideologies and how they vary. In late 2015 the authors engaged the public through a commission in a diverse city of approximately 500,000. Qualitative data was collected from three public focus groups with residents. Simultaneously, we obtained quantitative data from surveys. Participants’ data ideologies varied based on how they perceived data to be useful for collaboration, tasks, and translations. Bucking the “geek” stereotype, only a minority of those surveyed were professional software developers or engineers. Although only a nascent movement, we argue open data intermediaries have important roles to play in a new political landscape. (shrink)

The US and China have both benefited greatly from their trading relationship. However, motivated by a US concern that their partner was becoming more of a rival, then-president Donald Trump began a ‘trade war’ in 2018. In US news outlets and, of particular interest here, on American social media platforms, China was represented as a global menace, with extreme xenophobia against Chinese people. Yet less is known about how Chinese people responded on social media to the same situation. This paper (...) explores the discourses carried on the Chinese social media platform Weibo, focusing on the 2021 Alaska talks between the US and China, where negotiations took place. As with their US counterparts, Weibo users comment little on actual trade benefits or damages caused by the conflict. We find a strong sense of nationalism, but this is not based on xenophobia; rather on a discourse comparing the talks to similar events early in the twentieth century, where the ‘Century of Humiliation’ began, and where territories such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Shaoshan were taken by colonial powers. Foregrounded is China’s ability now to end this humiliation. (shrink)

Moral judgments about a situation are profoundly shaped by the perception of individuals in that situation as either moral agents or moral patients (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012), Specifically, the more we see someone as a moral agent, the less we see them as a moral patient, and vice versa. As a result, casting the perpetrator of a transgression as a victim tends to have the effect of making them seem less blameworthy (Gray & Wegner, 2011). (...) Based on this theoretical framework, we predicted that criminal offenders with a mental disorder that predisposes them to antisocial behavior would be judged more negatively when the disorder is described as having a genetic origin than when it is described as environmentally caused, as in the case of childhood abuse or accident. Further, we predicted that some environmental explanations would mitigate attributions of blame more than others, namely, that offenders whose disorder was caused by childhood abuse (intentional harm) would be seen as less blameworthy than offenders whose disorder is caused by an unfortunate accident (unintentional harm). Results from two vignette-based studies designed to test these predictions, conducted with participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 244 and N = 387, respectively), confirmed the first prediction but not the second. Implications of this research for three areas — the psychology of moral judgment, philosophical debates about moral responsibility and determinism, and the practice of the law — are discussed in the sequel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 15-18 [Access article in PDF] Through a Glass, Darkly:Commentary on Ward Gwen Adshead Keywords: psychopathy, moral reasoning. Now we see, as through a glass darkly.... (St Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, Chapter 13) JIM DID AN EVIL THING. He deliberately caused another person's suffering in a way that was humiliating, cruel, and persistent. He very nearly killed another man. He knew (...) what he was doing; he knew it was wrong, but somehow, that did not matter to him. After he was caught, he came to a forensic psychiatric facility where he was offered therapy. (What the purpose of therapy is could be the subject of a paper in its own right, although I will say a little more about this at the end of the paper). Several years on, Jim has had many thoughts about his behavior. First, he has no doubt that he was responsible insofar as he chose to do what he did, and he feels guilty on that count. Second, he is also aware that he had consciously carried out such acts many times in his mind before, but had not previously acted out his fantasy; and that therefore the process of crossing the line between fantasy and reality is a crucial one for him to think about further. This metaphor of a line that has to be crossed from one place to another suggests two worlds: one of internal reality and the other of external reality. Jim used the metaphor thus: "I came up to the line, but I drew back." He also said of this moment (when he nearly killed his first victim): "I said to myself... 'This is mad... I can't justify this.'... " I have emphasized these words of Jim's because I want to use his experience to explore some of the arguments raised in David Ward's most interesting paper. I found much to agree with, and some claims that sat less easily. I should say that the context of my response is my work as a psychotherapist with mentally disordered offenders in Broadmoor Hospital, and also a current research project with Jonathan Glover and Christine Brown on moral reasoning in antisocial men. Kant and Won't I have no doubt that most if not all of the men (and women) that I work with do operate according to universalizable principles. As the author suggests, however, these principles are incoherent and contain what Cleckley (1976) called a type of agnosia, or distorted vision. It seems to me that Kant's two forms of principle are really two different levels of intention or choice-making process. Kant's hypothetical level of intention is very much about making choices in the external world: I experience the world as cold, I want to be warm because I need to be warm, I will do what I need to do to make that need happen for me. It is not universalizable because [End Page 15] others may not feel the cold as I do. Notice that this level of intention may be very closely linked to the next level, which Kant calls categorical: I would like the world to be such that everyone who is needy will get their needs met, and I would like to be the sort of person who makes that happen. The categorical level of intention is Kant's take on the Golden Rule: that you should want everyone to be treated as you yourself would wish to be treated. It is an intentional process that is interpersonal, which implies a second order of thinking—thinking about one's thoughts and wishes, and thinking about the sort of person one would wish to be in relation to others.At this point, I think it may be helpful to bring in the other aspect of Kant's vision of moral intentions, which is the injunction to treat others as ends in themselves and not merely as means to ends. Thus every individual is a unique person or self, who claims respect as a person and not... (shrink)

Introductory Chapter to the _Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition_ (CUP, 2009).

This article gives an account of what makes achievements valuable. Although the natural thought is that achievements are valuable because of the product, such as a cure for cancer or a work of art, I argue that the value of the product of an achievement is not sufficient to account for its overall value. Rather, I argue that achievements are valuable in virtue of their difficulty. I propose a new perfectionist theory of value that acknowledges the will as a characteristic (...) human capacity, and thus holds that the exercise of the will, and therefore difficulty, is intrinsically valuable. (shrink)

Procedural justice, or the ability of people affected by decisions to participate in making them, is widely recognized as an important aspect of environmental justice. Procedural justice, moreover, requires that affected people have a substantial understanding of the hazards that a particular decision would impose. While EJ scholars and activists point out a number of obstacles to ensuring substantial understanding—including industry’s nondisclosure of relevant information and technocratic problem framings—this article shows how key insights from Science and Technology Studies about the (...) nature of knowledge pose even more fundamental challenges for procedural justice. In particular, the knowledge necessary to inform participation in decision making is likely not to exist at the time of decision making, undermining the potential for people to give their informed consent to being exposed to an environmental hazard. In addition, much of the local knowledge important to understanding the consequences of hazards will develop only after decisions have been made, and technoscientific knowledge of environmental effects will inevitably change over the period during which people will be affected by a hazard. The changing landscape of knowledge calls into question the idea that consent or participation during one decision-making process can by itself constitute procedural justice. An STS-informed understanding of the nature of knowledge, this article argues, implies that procedural justice should include proactive knowledge production to fill in knowledge gaps, and ongoing opportunities for communities to consent to the presence of hazards as local knowledge emerges and scientific knowledge changes. (shrink)

Within stakeholder literature, much attention has been given to which stakeholders "really count." This article strives to explain why organizational theorists should abandon the pursuit of "Who and What Really Counts" to challenge the assumption of a managerial perspective that defines stakeholder legitimacy. Reflecting on the paucity of employee rights and protections in marginalized work environments, I argue that as organizational researchers, we must recognize and take responsibility for the impact of our research models and visions. By confronting and rethinking (...) the foundational assumptions of stakeholder theory, business and society scholars can identify and pursue research questions that more effectively address contemporary social challenges. (shrink)

Why is pain bad? The most straightforward theory of pain's badness,dolorism, appeals to the phenomenal quality of displeasure. In spite of its explanatory appeal, the view is too straightforward to capture two central puzzles, namely pain that is enjoyed and pain that is not painful. These cases can be captured byconditionalism, which makes the badness of displeasure conditional on an agent's attitude. But conditionalism fails where dolorism succeeds with explanatory appeal. A new approach is proposed,reverse conditionalism, which maintains the explanatory (...) appeal of dolorism, but gives attitudes a value-defeating role. It is argued that this view does best in fulfilling the desiderata and capturing the cases. (shrink)

Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents. Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners than humans, and (...) building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further. (shrink)

I. EITHER-OR? NEITHER! The main features of the Enlightenment were the same everywhere: the autonomy of reason, the solidarity of intellectual culture, ...

This paper provides a novel response to Vlastos’s challenge that Platonic erōs in the Symposium, since it is for the form of beauty rather than any particular person, is impersonal and egotistical. Vlastos, in addition to generations of his readers and critics, badly misunderstands Diotima’s reproductive theory of love. In particular, it has been widely overlooked or diminished that the ideal erotic relationship set out in the ladder of love mirrors the reproductive labor of ancient Greek mothers and caregivers. The (...) lover of the highest mysteries undertakes the psychic equivalent of motherly care to rear virtuous ideas in the next generation. Thus, properly understanding Diotima’s gendered vision of psychic reproduction reveals that Platonic love is anything but impersonal and egotistical. (shrink)

This response to Dobson and White’s call for a feminine firm argues that such a concept is based on amisinterpretation of Gilligan’s research. Moreover, virtue ethics and feminine ethics do not share a common approach to nurturing relationships or the moral orientation of care. Acknowledging the worthwhile goals of Dobson and White’s endeavor, the feminist firm is presented as offering greater potential to achieve these goals.

What drives someone to commit an act of terrible violence? Drawing from her thirty years' experience in working with people who have committed serious offenses, Dr. Gwen Adshead provides fresh and surprising insights into violence and the mind. Through a collaboration with coauthor Eileen Horne, Dr. Adshead brings her extraordinary career to life in a series of unflinching portraits. In eleven vivid narratives based on decades of providing therapy to people in prisons and secure hospitals, an internationally renowned forensic (...) psychiatrist and psychotherapist demonstrates the remarkable human capacity for radical empathy, change, and redemption. Based on 30 years of experience working in prisons and secure psychiatric hospitals with people convicted of serious violent offenses, internationally renowned forensic psychiatrist Dr. Gwen Adshead presents an account of mental illness and the nature of evil in this compelling series of stories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on“Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility”Gwen Adshead (bio)AbstractIn this commentary, I address two points raised by Fields: the origin of other-regarding beliefs, and the management of psychopaths, if they are not criminally responsible (as Fields suggests). I argue that the capacity to form affective bonds is necessary in order to hold other-regarding beliefs, and that a psychological developmental perspective may be helpful in understanding the moral understanding (...) of the psychopath. In response to Fields’s view that psychopaths should receive “treatment,” I suggest that most forensic psychiatrists do not agree.Keywordspersonality disorder, empathy, development, remorse, attachment theoryInsufficient attention has been paid to the problem posed by so-called “psychopaths.” Lloyd Fields’s paper is therefore welcome. Here I shall focus on two issues: the nature and acquisition of other-regarding beliefs, and the implications for managing those who do not have them.Fields argues that there is a subgroup of psychopaths, unable to form “other-regarding beliefs”; that such beliefs provide a motivation for acting in a particular way, and result in a “[disposition] to experience certain emotions and to have certain attitudes.”But it is arguable that the disposition to experience certain emotions and have certain attitudes towards others could be critical to acquiring the capacity to have other-regarding beliefs. If one asks what stops people from hurting others, a common answer is that it makes people feel bad. To quote Mencius (Legge, 1960): “All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others.”The question then is, how does anyone acquire a notion of “the other,” such that failing to endorse other-regarding principles/beliefs has an adverse effect on the subject?Mencius’ “mind” implied “reciprocity,” and involved four components:i. The recognition of another’s distressii. Being moved by that distress (empathy)iii. Wishing to reduce that distress (sympathy)iv. Altruism (the sense of obligation to reduce distress, and guilt if one fails).By these criteria, (iv) resembles Fields’s “other-regarding” belief, in that the sense of obligation provides a reason for acting. I would argue that (iv) is a virtue, which requires (i), (ii) and (iii) as capacities—not necessarily separate, but different aspects of a broader “affective” capacity. It is this affective capacity which is arguably lacking in the psychopath.Some of these capacities have already been discussed in the literature of psychopathy. It is the [End Page 279] failure to recognize another’s distress which Cleckley describes in many of his cases (Cleckley 1964), and which he describes as a type of “agnosia.” This term implies some neuropathological deficit, and there is some evidence for such deficits in psychopaths, mainly in the autonomic nervous system. Blair (1995) has also suggested that psychopaths lack a (postulated) violence inhibitory mechanism (VIM).It could be argued, however, that such neuropathological hypotheses lead to circular arguments about psychopathy, as described by Barbara Wootton 1(Wootton 1959). A more fruitful account is offered by theories (such as attachment theory) which offer a developmental account which includes both psychological and neuropathological perspectives. Described and developed by Bowlby (1969), attachment theory draws on experimental work with non-human primates and emphasises the importance of relationships with significant others in infancy for the development of later social relationships (Harlow 1975; Ruppenthal et al 1976). Such attachment relationships are also important for the development of cortical neural networks, and the modulation of stress, which can itself be neurotoxic (Sapolsky 1994).How could attachment theory be relevant to acquiring an affective capacity? The earliest work on attachment behaviors showed that monkeys failing to make early attachments behaved recklessly with other monkeys, and could not make relationships (for example, to mate). Of particular relevance was the finding that such monkeys launched suicidal attacks on monkeys higher in the hierarchy; not dissimilar to those “self-defeating” behaviors which Cleckley described in human psychopaths.So much for possibly psychopathic monkeys; do humans with failed attachments lack affective capacity? There is evidence that substantial proportions of “psychopaths” have histories of failed attachments in childhood. The more severe the failure, the more severe the disturbance in adulthood, which might explain why there... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What’s His Story?Gwen Adshead (bio)Keywordsnarrative, violence, identityIn this commentary, I discuss three issues raised by Cartwright: whether and to what extent explanations from the past can adequately explain or excuse present actions, the nature of moral identity, and the notion of the moral community.I have often thought that psychiatrists and psychotherapists working with offenders have to be like writers of detective fiction. To make the story convincing, the (...) writer of detective fiction has to convey to the reader an understanding of the killer's motives. The successful writer enables the reader to appreciate the killer's reasons for killing; and these reasons offer to readers a tantalizing glimpse of what it might actually be like to be a violent and dangerous person; or more particularly, one who acts on their cruel and violent thoughts.Psychiatrists want to understand the reasons for their patient's violence, for several reasons (which probably include the voyeuristic pleasure that all humans seem to have at other people's disasters). However, the main reason is to do with prevention of future harm; if we understand the reasons that this happened, then we can take steps to make sure that it does not happen again. This view has been called the just world theory (Janoff Bulman 1989), which implies a world of predictable causes and reasons, where disasters occur because of an identifiable fault or omission that can be rectified with good result. The payoff of this view is that it gives the believer a sense of control, which after a disaster is important for maintaining confidence and self-esteem.The problem with this theory is that it presupposes that the world of human actions is essentially rational, and that people do things for reasons that make sense to them. However, much human cruelty has an irrational and unreasonable aspect to it; one that literally makes no sense. Cartwright's paper begins with a narrative about real people doing really dreadful things for no reasons that would ever satisfy the average detective story reader. Forensic mental health work is full of histories that are actually much stranger than any detective fiction.But it seems that humans are not happy with stories that do not make sense, even if senselessness is part of the natural world around them. As Cartwright indicates (see p. 150), when we hear about people like Robert Harris, we immediately move the field of inquiry from "Why did he do that?" to "Why is he like that?" With the rise of developmental psychology over the last 150 years, it has become natural to look at people's histories to see if this explains the person's present identity. In this sense, therefore, we seem to be natural Aristotelians, assuming that a man's character is revealed by his current actions: we also seem to be assuming that a man's character is an expression of past actions and events. [End Page 157]His-Story: Explaining the PresentIs this in fact the case? To what extent is it true that our identities are shaped by our past experiences? Even if this were the case, shaping is not the same as determining. There has always been a risk that developmental psychology will take up a similar position to genetics, with regard to explaining behavior; namely, that there are those who will try to argue that the presence of this, that, or the other gene, or this, that, or the other experience, both determines and "explains" the behavior. The moral point here is that when it comes to violent and antisocial behaviors, a person's past history is said to simultaneously explain the behavior, determine the behavior, and excuse it, by implying that the actor had no choice about what he did, given his past. This has been taken to an extreme in the US criminal courts, with what Dershowitz (1994) has called "the abuse excuse" (used most notably in the trial of the Menendez brothers, who killed their parents and claimed at the trial that their parents had abused them).Trials are about evidence, and it is worth considering the evidence about the effect of early childhood adversity... (shrink)

Perfectionism, the view that well-being is a matter of developing characteristically human capacities, has relatively few defenders in the literature, but plenty of critics. This paper defends perfectionism against some recent formulations of classic objections, namely, the objection that perfectionism ignores the relevance of pleasure or preference for well-being, and a sophisticated version of the ‘wrong properties’ objection, according to which the intuitive plausibility of the perfectionist ideal is threatened by an absence of theoretical pressure to accept putative wrong properties (...) cases. The paper argues these objections are unsuccessful, but introduce a new worry, the Deep Problem: Perfectionism fails to offer a satisfying foundational justification for why developing the human essence is valuable. The paper responds to the deep problem, ultimately arguing that it is a puzzle put to all theories of well-being to provide a justification for their normative significance. (shrink)

Scientific instruments can help to shape and re-shape epistemic boundaries, especially those between communities of scienti?c researchers. But how do they function at boundaries between scienti?c communities and communities of non-experts? This paper examines the use of air monitoring instruments at the boundary between petrochemical facilities and nearby residential communities, asking whether a new generation of fenceline monitors shared by industry (and regulatory agency) experts and community members alter the epistemic boundary between the two groups. Arguing that epistemic communities organized (...) around instruments are characterized, in part, by a common understanding of the evidential contexts for instrumental data, the paper shows how the evidential contexts in which experts and residents interpret monitoring data diverge. Instead of the new, shared fenceline monitors helping to reconcile differences over evidential contexts, those pre-existing contexts shape the interpretation of data from the new instruments–perpetuating epistemic boundaries between industry experts and community members. (shrink)

This paper reviews the paper by Kuzma, Najmaie, and Larson that looks at what can be learned from the experience with genetically engineered organisms for oversight of emerging technologies more generally. That paper identifies key attributes of a good oversight system: promoting innovation, ensuring safety, identifying benefits, assessing costs, and doing so all while building public confidence. In commenting on that analysis, this paper suggests that looking at “oversight” in three phases — research and development, regulatory review, and market acceptance (...) — can help to determine when certain of these attributes should take precedence over others and how to structure remedies when an error occurs. The result is an approach that is precautionary with respect to research and development, prudent and open to public input in the regulatory review stage, and purposefully persuasive once market acceptability is at stake, with remedies that are risk-containing in the first phase, risk-managing in the second, and risk-assuaging in the third. Combining the key attributes with the idea of three phases can help attune oversight to society's needs. (shrink)

Agroecological transitions aim at developing sustainable farming and food systems, adapted to local contexts. Such transitions require the engagement of local actors and the consideration of their knowledge and reasoning as a whole, which encompasses different natures of knowledge (empirical, scientific, local, generic), related to different dimensions (economic, environmental, technical, social, political), as well as their values and perceived uncertainties. While these transitions are often problematized in relation to technical issues, this article's objective is to start from the way the (...) local actors consider these transitions in order to see what issues are actually involved. In this study, we analyzed the reasoning of diverse farming actors, including farmers and farm advisors. We conducted 30 cognitive mapping interviews, during which the local actors drew cognitive maps to explicit their reasoning concerning their agroecological transition with an open approach. Their reasoning revealed an emphasis on the human & social dimension of the process of agroecological transitions: (i) human and social considerations come first in the transition process, while technical solutions are viewed as secondary, (ii) use and development of human capacities, social interactions and human well-being are crucial to the conduct of agroecological transitions, (iii) human-scale farming appears as a condition for the use of human capacities, human well-being and rural development, (iv) agroecological transitions imply farming advisory transitions, and (v) rural development appears as a condition for agroecological transitions, implying transitions in society as a whole. (shrink)

Núñez and colleagues (2019) question whether cognitive science still exists “as a coherent academic field with a well‐defined and cohesive interdisciplinary research program.” This worry may be premature on two grounds. First, we are not convinced that the Lakatosian criterion of coalescence around a core framework is the best standard for judging whether a field is well‐defined and productive. Second, although we acknowledge that cognitive science is not as visible as we would like, we doubt that this low profile accurately (...) reflects the state of actual research and teaching programs based on the cognitive science approach. (shrink)